
Featured analysis: Boosting agriculture will undercut causes of many African conflicts
Informed insights: African governance: How democracy is undermined in Angola, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe
Off the radar: Developments the world media missed
Latest developments across Africa’s five regions
Africa Conflict Monitor distinguishes itself from the usual international coverage of Africa’s conflict developments by looking beyond the tumult and personalities of the day toward brewing problems on the horizon. These trends usually have historic antecedents and forebode huge problems to come, and yet can be managed through planning and applied technologies current today. One such dilemma which is a source of strife today and certain conflict tomorrow, if not mitigated, is food insecurity on the continent. ACM’s June edition devotes its Featured Analysis to this topic.

Like an event to be expected on the calendar each year, the annual perilous sea-going migration of Africans to Europe returned with the warming Mediterranean waters in June. ACM asks in our analysis of this year’s fatalities: has repetition of this migration become an accepted norm to the international community, which has not offered solutions to stop the human traffic flow at its source?

Another crisis of the day, which if not addressed, will bring doom to Africa in the future is the continent’s population boom. The issue seems to have disappeared from most nations’ development strategies, and the political will to curb fertility is nearly absent from leadership. This matter of long-term concern concludes this month’s topically wide-ranging ACM.

Ufundze kahle! ("Read well!")

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Cover photo courtesy AMISOM Public Information/Flickr
Boosting agriculture will undercut causes of many African conflicts

Food security is a key to Africa’s economic and social growth and is also tied to conflicts. Once agricultural self-sufficiency is established, the continent’s security will be heightened.

Agriculture should be the engine for Africa’s growth, the best means to alleviate poverty and boost economies, noted Akinwumi Adesina, the president of the African Development Bank (AfDB). Adesina, Nigeria’s former agriculture minister, made the point that agriculture is seen as a social activity in Africa, one with deep cultural roots, where traditional practices bring sustenance to millions, and as a development/humanitarian function. The latter involves raising nutritional levels to raise populations’ health and to boost education through school feeding schemes for children.

South Sudanese farmer Kuay Makuach, from the North Jonglei region, laments the year’s meagre harvest, which he puts down to a severe drought and the ongoing conflict that disrupted planting and sent much of his community fleeing.

Photo courtesy Oxfam East Africa/Wikimedia Commons

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The AfDB president sees agriculture through a different perspective, as “the biggest money-making business in the world.” Adesina wants governments to create pro-agriculture policies, incentives and infrastructure and then step back to allow the private sector to invest in the agricultural value chain, “from producing to processing, from farm to fork.”

From a business and economics perspective, Adesina’s prescription is spot on. However, there is another aspect to food security that is both larger and more fundamental to Africa’s growth: the value agriculture plays in conflict eradication. Adesina feels the key players in any government cabinet that ought to be involved in the issue of food security are the ministers of agriculture, finance and trade. To this trio should be added the minister of defence. The correlation between food insecurity and conflict is evident throughout the continent. Where food security is not an issue, such as Northern Africa, South Africa and the island nations of Mauritius and Seychelles, bloodshed from armed conflict is rare.

### Acute food insecurity and conflict in Africa in 2017

Periodic droughts across East and Southern Africa regularly impact food security in those regions. However, the areas of greatest food insecurity across Africa are not those affected by poor rainfall, but by conflict. Of the 19 African countries that currently face crisis, emergency or catastrophic levels of food insecurity, 11 are experiencing some degree of civil conflict.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Food insecurity level</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Crisis</td>
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Emergency</td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
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<td>Libya</td>
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<td>Mali</td>
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<td>Chad</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Crisis</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Crisis</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Crisis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Emergency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Where food insecurity is most prevalent, such as in the Horn of Africa, Central Africa and impoverished Sub-Saharan countries, militias raid through undeveloped areas while coups d’état routinely change the governance in capital cities.

**Shrinking pasturelands bring fighting**

Nomadic herders in Kenya and tribal herders in Mali instigated violent clashes within their areas that have claimed dozens of lives in 2017. These are previews of more clashes to come in Africa, firstly, as herders face growing production crises due to shrinkage of pastureland from climate change and human population pressures. Secondly, farmers will encounter the dilemma of diminishing arable land as human settlements expand and global warming brings fiercer storms and more devastating droughts. In Mali, 13 people were killed in fighting between the Fulani and Bambara tribes during a few days of unrest in February, although Fulani rights groups placed the fatalities at 45. The Fulani are herders and the Bambara are farmers. The two groups have co-existed for generations, and their numbers have grown in modern times, putting pressure on limited land resources around Macina, an area 300km northeast of Bamako. With the national government struggling to assert its authority nationwide due to militant activity elsewhere, assisted by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), local areas have been left to sort out their own concerns. Into this vacuum has appeared Islamic fundamentalist groups that have recruited from the Fulani, using their alarm over imperilled livelihoods as a recruitment tool. Consequently, jihadist militant activity that was confined to the country’s north for years is moving southward.

In Kenya, another scenario involving land and fatal conflict is emerging. Once again, herders deprived of pastureland appear at the heart of the contretemps. Driving their cattle into the country’s protected wildlife conservancies, herders have been expelled by police in sometimes violent clashes. For generations, the 90,000 acre Laikipia Nature Conservancy has allowed local herders to graze their cattle alongside wildlife. That access had to be ended after herders from hundreds of kilometres away descended on the conservancy.
Food insecurity and poor nutrition are among the leading contributors to under-development across Sub-Saharan Africa. Above: Seven-year-old Ngikadelio Ngiken, who suffers from severe acute malnutrition, sucks from a sachet of ready-to-use therapeutic food at a health clinic in Turkana County, northwest Kenya, 29 March 2017. Below: A woman with her baby follows a UK serviceman, carrying food to her remote island village in Sierra Leone, which experienced food shortages in the wake of the Ebola epidemic in 2014.

Photos courtesy Russell Watkins/DFID/Flickr; Cpl Jamie Peters/Defence Images/Flickr
The vegetation was devastated, watering holes overrun and 80 elephants wantonly slaughtered. A well-known secret in Kenya is that some of the cattle belong to prominent politicians who are using them as a means to launder money they have acquired through corruption. ‘Tribal warriors’, as they are described in the Kenyan press, have rampaged through privately owned ranches and tourism venues, killing a former British army officer on a game farm in April and shooting and wounding author and nature conservationist Kuki Gallmann on her ranch that month. Government responded with an armed police offensive in which numerous herders’ precious cattle were killed. This escalated the confrontation as outraged herders responded by setting fire to other privately owned ranches. If politicians are behind these attacks, a major scandal and international crisis will unfold. However, regardless of the particular persons involved, the fundamental issue remains the same – inadequate land to sustain the traditional African life of cattle herding. Africans will eventually adapt, raising cattle in feeding farms rather than through itinerant grazing where feed is provided free by nature. As for subsistence farmers, adaption is impossible without government programmes that would modernise agriculture, make land use more efficient by introducing new climate change resistant technology, and offer financing for communal agricultural projects.

Food brings development and demands for social serenity

Beyond the physical battles over land that must be addressed, the under-development of agriculture in Africa is the paramount reason for the continent’s lagging growth. In his book Guns, Germs and Steel, Jared Diamond documented poor food production as the historic impediment to Africa’s growth compared to other continents. Factors due largely to geography kept food insecurity high and populations low as Africans spent their time desperately seeking basic sustenance. Meanwhile, Europe and Asia achieved food self-sufficiency, allowing for the growth of a scholarly class that pioneered scientific and technological advances.

As for subsistence farmers, adaption is impossible without government programmes that would modernise agriculture, make land use more efficient by introducing new climate change resistant technology, and offer financing for communal agricultural projects. Today, agricultural production can be raised throughout Africa. The impediment is not technological but political, a lack of governmental will to even meet obligations via UN treaties to devote 10% of their budgets to agriculture. Once food security is achieved, Africans – now confined to subsistence farming – will have access to educational opportunities, the middle-class will expand and development on all fronts will accelerate. The growth of the middle-class in particular will reduce various forms of conflict. These will include government corruption as the tax-paying, conservative middle-class demands accountability from its elected officials and to pressure for armed conflict avoidance. Conflict disrupts lives, and voters and taxpayers will have a say in matters that today’s struggling, docile and victimised African peasantry does not. Terrorist groups will have their pool of potential recruiters reduced when hunger and poverty contract.

The profit lure will bring food security

As AfDB President Adesina noted, “The African future is not, as some people think, based on oil and gas. You can’t drink oil or eat gas. The future is food. You can eat food. Our continent’s food and agriculture markets will be worth US$ 1 trillion within 13 years.” Because other arguments to boost African food production have failed to shift the paradigm from the majority of farming being of the subsistence kind and the herding of the environmentally unsustainable method, the business model proposed by Africa’s top banker should work. However, the business model overlooks the effect that food security brings to conflict reduction. Conflict is the destructive adversary to any business enterprise but armament manufacturing. If Africa can supply for itself much of its US$ 1 trillion food markets in a few years’ time, human development will ensure that all forms of security are obtained, beginning with food security.
FEATURED ANALYSIS

ACM ANALYSIS IN BRIEF | Boosting agriculture will undercut causes of many African conflicts

Food scarcity is more than a humanitarian crisis and economic challenge; it is also a source of conflict certain to worsen. However, the alternative that provides for food security will boost chances for conflict eradication.

Key points:
- Deadly fighting in Mali and Kenya pitting herders, farmers and nature conservatories against one another preview land use conflicts to come
- Africa now has the technological means to boost agricultural production, but governments lack the political will to aggressively change agricultural production
- Africa’s food markets will be worth US$ 1 trillion by 2030 and, if Africa supplies its own markets, significant prosperity will result

RELEVANT READING ...

➔ ‘The future of African food security’
In On Africa’s report explores the current state of food security in light of severe droughts in much of Sub-Sharan Africa, as well as the long-term impacts of these droughts and rising global temperatures - http://bit.ly/2s38fO6

➔ ‘2016 Africa regional overview of food security and nutrition’
The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation shows that, while food supply in Sub-Saharan Africa is sufficient on aggregate, several countries in the region are highly dependent on food imports to ensure adequate food supplies - http://bit.ly/2qqTDXT

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LIBYA joined Egypt as the first African countries to participate in the Saudi Arabia-led diplomatic and physical isolation of Qatar purportedly to punish Doha for sponsoring terrorist groups. Eritrea, Mauritania and Senegal also joined the initiative, while Ethiopia considered its options which, like the other countries, meant weighing the aid and opportunities dangled by Saudi Arabia. As the diplomatic and economic boycott of Qatar hit in June, no international effort arose to stem developments until Alpha Conde, the chairperson of the African Union (AU), offered to mediate. The AU’s offer to promote a dialogue highlighted how the Qatar situation, which is based on Muslim sectarian rivalries, impacts Africa. As for Libya, the Qatar boycott decision was a rare foray into foreign affairs for a government scarcely able to function under conditions of Libya’s ipso facto civil war.

The Rif region of MOROCCO, historically the home of politically independent-minded residents, in May and June saw a resurgence of protests originating from the October 2016 accidental death of a fish monger in a dispute with local authorities. While the demonstrations call for political reforms and not revolution, Africa’s last major absolute monarchy of King Mohammed has reacted sternly. Using state media to attack human rights protests with misleading propaganda, government found pretexts to arrest protest leaders on such grounds as ‘humiliating government officials’ and ‘hostility to symbols of the monarchy’. Such heavy-handed tactics are a certain way to inflame anti-government passions. The jailing of 70 human rights activists comes at a time of considerable diplomatic outreach by Morocco which, after its re-admission into the African Union earlier in 2017, in June received provisional acceptance into the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which, in turn, is willing to expand its territorial mandate to accommodate Rabat.

The government of President Abdel el-Sisi of EGYPT continued its crackdown on non-governmental organisations. Sisi signed a law passed by the legislature that severely restricts the operations of NGOs, and further inhibits human rights and civil freedoms with the intended consequence of stifling criticism of his regime. Done on the pretext that civil society is in league with terrorist groups, the quasi-military government of former coup d’état leader Sisi cannot tolerate dissent and does not understand democratic processes. Real security concerns exist in Egypt, not from NGOs but from Islamic State (ISIS) militants who have perpetrated attacks on security forces in the Sinai.
The People's Republic of China expressed displeasure with Uganda for Kampala's criminal probe of Chinese government officials in Uganda for their alleged role in ivory smuggling. Two Chinese diplomats were being investigated for involvement in the use of Uganda as a transit point for ivory smuggled from the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo en route to China. Kampala issued an apology on 12 June for investigating one diplomat who was cleared of wrongdoing, but under murky circumstances.

There seemed no debate about the motive for the governments of Egypt and Ethiopia to ask the UN Security Council to stop legal proceedings against Sudan dictator Omar al-Bashir. The International Criminal Court has indicted Bashir for war crimes and human rights abuses. These are the same crimes that may be happening in Egypt under the militaristic government of President Abdel el-Sisi and Ethiopia's regime under its State of Emergency that is intended to stifle the protests of the Oromo peoples. Typical of African leaders who defend their fellow strongman Bashir, Ethiopia and Egypt's rulers made no mention of justice for Bashir's alleged victims.

Kenya is on edge in anticipation of its August national elections in which incumbent President Uhuru Kenyatta seeks a new term. Human Rights Watch was among the civil society groups objecting to government intimidation of journalists on election-related reporting, and for issuing threats of arrests for ill-defined transgressions. Of greater concern to Kenyans is whether, if the polls show a close contest leading up to the vote, Kenyatta's party will revert to the violence that claimed over a thousand victims during the 2007/8 elections that Kenyatta ultimately won.
Piracy and crimes on the high seas, from smuggling to human trafficking, have made dangerous and disreputable the Gulf of Guinea and parts of Africa’s Atlantic coast. Gulf of Guinea piracy has exceeded piracy off Somalia. To combat piracy and other maladies, 19 African Atlantic coastal nations, led by Senegal, but extending southward to Angola, in early June launched the Gulf of Guinea Inter-Regional Network (GONGIN). Information sharing and coordination of the coastal nations’ navies are primary goals of GONGIN.

Militant Islamic jihadist groups in northern Mali are facing fiercer international resistance as efforts continue to stabilise the whole of the Sahel region. French soldiers in the Sahel-wide Operation Barkhane killed 20 militants, using Tiger attack helicopters and Mirage 2000 jets, as well as caches of munitions and weapons in Mali itself. The counter-insurgency attack happened shortly before three UN peacekeepers were killed in an attack on a UN camp in Mali in early June by a consortium of three Malian jihadist groups affiliated with al-Qaeda.

Liberia played host to several West African leaders at a summit with Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in early June. The Israeli PM is keen on boosting African ties with the region for diplomatic, economic and security reasons. His charm offensive and promises of aid resulted in President Macky Sall of Senegal restoring his country’s bilateral relations with Tel Aviv. Netanyahu told the West African leaders he believes the time has come for the African Union to grant Israel Observer Status at the continental body’s meetings. Togo will be the next regional site for an Israel-West Africa summit, when Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé, the new chairperson of the Economic Community of West African States hosts a major Africa-Israel economic and security summit in October.
CENTRAL AFRICA

Bail was denied leaders of civil society groups who orchestrated anti-government protests against the authoritative president of CAMEROON Paul Biya. What made the legal proceedings against the defendants problematic is that they were being conducted by a military tribunal rather than a court of law. The protestors were English speakers and part of a broad movement in Anglophone northwest and southwest Cameroon against discrimination and ‘cultural genocide’.

No end in sight exists for the Kabila family’s hold on power over the DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC) as, months after his term expired, presidential office holder Joseph Kabila remained coy on when he will allow new elections. A deal meticulously moulded by DRC church groups when Kabila’s second and constitutionally final term ended in December 2016, concluded with Kabila agreeing to elections by the end of 2017 to determine his replacement. In an interview in June, he backed away from the signed pledge. More is at stake than Kabila’s presidency. The unsettled political landscape in Kinshasa has led to a security vacuum in eastern areas where militia group aggressions continued. Any legitimate government would have dealt with the rebel groups years ago.

UN Secretary General António Guterres and Pope Francis continued to press for peace in the CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR), but their entreaties were anomalies in an international community largely indifferent to ongoing violence in CAR, where militia violence has made deadly many parts of the country outside the capital Bangui. On the heels of a new UN report declaring abuses committed in CAR were so appalling they will likely be the basis for war crimes and genocide indictments for their perpetrators, the Norwegian Refugee Council in June ranked CAR among the world’s 10 most neglected crises. On 12 June, CAR’s UN ambassador reported that “incremental” progress against rebel groups was occurring but only through the intervention of UN peacekeepers, which he said must continue their role.
Former Prime Minister of LESOTHO, Tom Thabane, won a snap 3 June election, after spending much time in recent years self-exiled in South Africa, fearing assassination at home. Altogether 120 seats of the National Assembly were selected by the Basotho people in an election that was constitutionally required after Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili lost a vote of no confidence in parliament. Tired of sending in troops or engaging in lengthy diplomatic missions after frequent governance breakdowns in Maseru, South Africa warned the Lesotho military against further coups d'état. Seemingly unsettled about this, Thabane urged his fellow politicians to get along, learn to compromise and to firmly commit to a power-sharing formula as the only way government can work, given Lesotho’s myriad political parties.

The murder rate in SOUTH AFRICA is becoming a humanitarian crisis as well as a national agony; and the Institute of Race Relations reported in June that South Africans have a greater chance of dying from unnatural causes than residents of some of Africa’s war-torn or terrorism-besieged nations. Some 500,000 South Africans have been murdered since the country achieved multi-racial democracy in 1994, more than the population of some African countries. Children are particularly affected, with 10,000 children killed since 2007. Fearing xenophobic attacks against foreign nationals such as flared in recent years throughout the country, fewer students from other African countries are enrolling South Africa’s universities, despite the country’s schools ranking among the top educational institutions on the continent.

ZIMBABWE’s President Robert Mugabe had hoped that when US President Donald Trump took office in January 2017 the American executive who has shown tolerance toward autocratic national leaders like Egypt’s President Abdel el-Sisi would rethink US policy toward Harare. Specifically, Mugabe wants an end to US sanctions imposed on the country, even though this would mean losing his government’s perennial excuse for its failures in economic policy. However in June, Trump sent an envoy from the US State Department to Harare with a reportedly undiplomatic “demand for political and economic reforms.” Mugabe was in Mexico at the time, attending a UN conference on the oceans, although he runs a landlocked nation.
Libya’s sea exodus: When a humanitarian crisis becomes routine

When the Mediterranean waters grow warm each Northern Hemisphere spring, a great human migration of illegal crossings begins, requiring long-term solutions.

The international community customarily shows alarm at the annual tales of death by drowning of migrants crossing the Mediterranean en route to hoped-for better lives in Europe. However, rather than address the root causes for the movement, humanitarian organisations, European navies and the UN have come to view the annual event as unfortunate business-as-usual, like a recurring drought. Mitigation efforts, such as the interception of craft and rescues when unseaworthy vessels capsize, are mostly what is offered, despite the prominent coverage the Mediterranean migrant situation receives on global television news networks.
No migrant wishes to give his or her life savings to a human trafficker and risk death on the open sea. Therefore, conditions must be desperate in their home countries to compel such people to resort to this journey in an effort to find employment and safety for their families. Not just men and women but also husbands and wives with their children are making the voyage in 2017. Migrant numbers are up this year from 2016 and so are known migrant deaths. Until economic and security improvements are made in Eastern and Central Africa, in particular, the ghastly spectacle of Africans drowning while escaping oppressive circumstances will continue to weigh on the world’s conscience.

**Dramatic sea rescues are news optics devoid of context**

From the latter part of April through June 2017, international news broadcasts showed – at least weekly and usually more often – dramatic scenes of African migrants saved from perishing in the Mediterranean. Usually rescue operations were conducted after vessels, some little more than rubber rafts loaded with dozens of people, had capsized. In other situations, media views were aired of hundreds of migrants crammed together in open boats, about to be transferred before their vessels sank under the waves. Accompanying these pictures were statistics: 523 asylum seekers known to have drowned in 2017 by March; 2,000 illegal migrants en route to Europe intercepted on one day alone, 29 April; Italian navy picking up survivors of a capsized boat on 4 May while an unknown number of others from the sunken craft perished.

The seasonal routine of Mediterranean crossings from Libya and Tunisia is drawing a reaction similar to any repeating natural disaster. Mitigation efforts are put into place. However, the migrant crossings are manmade and not natural disasters. This factor, usually overlooked in news coverage, means that the migrant flow need not be inevitable. However, the conditions that prompt the exodus and render difficult the stopping of migration on the African side are so daunting that an air of inevitability attaches itself to the human movement. For instance, Eritrea is the country that sends forth more economic and political refugees into Europe than any other African nation. Eritreans are fleeing a lack of economic opportunity and also the country’s totalitarian regime. The latter quandary is well entrenched and its removal, which would also lead to better economic conditions in Eritrea, is not likely to occur in the foreseeable future.

> **The conditions that prompt the exodus and render difficult the stopping of migration on the African side are so daunting that an air of inevitability attaches itself to the human movement.**

Similarly, the security problems of the Sahel and Central Africa, as well as the lack of employment in Nigeria and Western African countries from which Europe-bound migrants originate, will not be immediately remedied. As for stopping migrants on land before they reach the Mediterranean, two factors complicate this remedy. The first is the breakdown of security in civil war torn Libya. African nations of the Sahel with their long, often uncontrolled borders allow for the unimpeded illegal passage of immigrants. Libya’s political chaos offers opportunities to bribe immigration and police officials to look the other way. The bribery is often done by human traffickers. Overlooked in the migrant discussion is the sheer volume of humans willing to pay high prices for passage, which has made human trafficking a lucrative industry upon which not just the traffickers but corrupt officials depend for income. While the Libyan Coast Guard has requested funding from the European Union to step up its sea patrol efforts, Europeans are concerned that the money might not be properly utilised but rather be siphoned off by corruption.

**The horror of the migrants’ experience may lead to a remedy**

Seemingly tired with the same pictures of overloaded boats floundering at sea, some international news organisations are delving deeper into the migrants’ stories. Their investigations are producing horror stories of the kind that spark international outrage, which is often followed by calls for action. Such a scenario led to an international response to locate Nigeria’s Chibok girls who were kidnapped by the Boko Haram terror group in 2014 and an earlier campaign to end the murderous activities of Ugandan warlord Joseph Kony.

One development uncovered by the UN’s International Organisation for Migration (IOM) was the enslavement of migrants. Some asylum seekers are abducted by human traffickers and sold as workers and sex slaves in Libya. Such a worker can be purchased for only US$ 200, and the highest price reported by IOM is only US$ 500. Fortunately, the period of enslavement ends after three months. “Migrants are being sold in the market as a commodity. Selling human beings is becoming a trend among smugglers as the smuggling networks in Libya are becoming stronger,” reported Othman Belbeisi, who runs the IOM’s Libya office.
One in every 23 migrants that attempted the Mediterranean crossing in 2016 died, making this the deadliest year yet for those taking this route from North Africa to Europe. Above: Migrants attempting the dangerous Mediterranean crossing are rescued from their crowded vessel adrift off the coast of Libya, 27 June 2016. Below: Sailors aboard the USS Carney provide security while members of the SOS Mediterranean ship MS Aquarius rescue migrants on a small craft in the Mediterranean Sea, 29 July 2016.

Photos courtesy Irish Defence Forces/Flickr; US Navy/Weston Jones/Flickr
Such news for an international community that is alarmed by incidents of slavery in today’s world can be an inducement for serious action against human trafficking.

Capping the movement of migrants through North Africa was the intention of an agreement between Algeria and Sudan on 7 May 2017 to “co-ordinate peace and stability in Libya.” The agreement was bilateral, with Libya itself left out of the equation because of the absence of a strong central government in Libya. Tunisia is negotiating with European countries, particularly Italy, on assistance to thwart illegal migration northward. Germany has initiated some of its own efforts to address illegal migration. For security reasons, some African countries are monitoring migrants’ movements with an eye on terrorist activity. On 9 May 2017, South Sudanese authorities arrested three Kenyans and a Somali for recruiting people to the Islamic State group and smuggling them to Libya and other countries for passage to Europe.

Ending migration is a long-term effort

While European governments are increasingly co-ordinating with their African counterparts to intercept migrants at sea, there is a recognition among all governments that the flow of asylum seekers will not diminish until security and economic conditions improve in the migrants’ nations of origin. Given the time required to improve both such situations, the dangerous sea pilgrimage to Europe will remain an annual man-made disaster.

“There is a recognition among all governments that the flow of asylum seekers will not diminish until security and economic conditions improve in the migrants’ nations of origin.”

ACM ANALYSIS IN BRIEF | Libya’s sea exodus: When a humanitarian crisis becomes routine

The Mediterranean continues to be the most utilised route for African migrants making the often deadly illegal sea passage to Europe. The migration draws the attention of the international media because of the dramatic rescue scenes offered, while the fundamental economic and security issues in Africa that prompt migration await solutions.

Key points:

- The number of migrants moved by human traffickers across the Mediterranean increases seasonally from April through the Northern Hemisphere’s summer
- The UN’s International Organisation for Migration reports human traffickers are selling migrants into slavery in Libya
- Tunisia and unstable Libya, in particular, are the primary points of departure for African migrants headed for Europe

RELEVANT READING ...

‘The Central Mediterranean route: Deadlier than ever’

The international Organisation for Migration provides detailed facts and figures for the migration across the Central Mediterranean from North Africa to Europe that killed thousands of people in 2016


‘The economic power of Africa’s migrants’

This In On Africa article argues that African migrants, fleeing war and economic hardship, are not simply helpless victims but rather many are skilled workers who enrich the economies of their host countries

COMMERCE COMMENTARY | Tunisians serious about ending government corruption

Six years after the fall of Tunisia’s dictator Ben Ali, Tunisians are grappling with the residual culture of government corruption that is the continuing legacy of Ali’s regime. Street demonstrations in May focused on corruption, with protestors vehement that malpractices end and corrupt officials be brought to book. Switzerland gave back to the government US$ 4 million stolen by Ali and kept in Swiss banks, but US$ 62 million of looted Tunisian money still awaits repatriation from those banks. However, anti-government protestors say national economic growth and Tunisians’ desire for clean government dedicated to people’s needs will never be realised until the culture of corruption is vanquished. For officials used to living on bribes and businesses satisfied that bribe-giving is the most efficient way of getting things done, the change of habit is not going to be voluntary and will require concerted government effort. - M.M.

INVESTOR INSIGHTS:

The exodus of migrants, at great danger to themselves, from Africa to Europe underscores the critical importance of economic systems that provide opportunity, and political systems that provide Rule of Law. A mature approach to the current migrant crisis should focus on the different time-frames for response, incorporating the short-term efforts to help those migrants in urgent need of assistance. But also needed, is a longer-term response to economic engagement and socio-economic reforms in the countries of origin that works to assure that this is the last generation to feel compelled to flee their homelands due to perpetual economic hardships. - A.C.
Sailing close to the wind in the Central Mediterranean: The world’s deadliest migration route

The Central Mediterranean route, from North Africa to Italy, is now the main route taken by irregular migrants to Europe. The route is also the world’s most deadly. Between 2011 and 2016, some 630,000 irregular migrants and refugees reached Italy via the Central Mediterranean. More than 13,000 lost their lives attempting the crossing, and many more died on their journey through the Sahara.

From 1 January to 14 June 2017:

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<td>65,450</td>
<td>1,737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Route</td>
<td>8,240</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Libya is the departure point for 90% of those travelling to Europe via Italy.
The significant increase in recent years of migrants attempting the Central Mediterranean crossing has triggered a change in response, from ad-hoc rescues in the high seas, to institutionalised surveillance operations. Along with search and rescue operations by the Italian Coast Guards and Custom Guards, Frontex’s Operation Triton and EUNavFor Sophia, as well as commercial shipping vessels, several NGOs active in the area also effect the rescue of thousands of migrants in the Central Mediterranean each day:

In the majority of cases, smugglers use cheap rubber dinghies instead of bigger boats, which increases the number of deadly incidents at sea.

- Rubber dinghies: 70%
- Wooden boats: 21%
- Fishing boats: 7%
- Sailing boats: 2%

70% of these migrants come from countries or regions not suffering from violent conflicts.

The death toll along the Central Mediterranean route rose by more than a third from 2015 to 2016:

- The death toll along the Central Mediterranean route

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Death Toll</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>3,161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2,869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>4,579</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most arrivals in Italy via the Central Mediterranean route in 2016 were from Africa:

- Nigeria (28%)
- Eritrea (15%)
- Guinea (15%)
- Côte d’Ivoire (10%)
- Gambia (10%)
- Senegal (9%)
- Mali (8%)
- Sudan (8%)
- Somalia (7%)

The significant increase in recent years of migrants attempting the Central Mediterranean crossing has triggered a change in response, from ad-hoc rescues in the high seas, to institutionalised surveillance operations. Along with search and rescue operations by the Italian Coast Guards and Custom Guards, Frontex’s Operation Triton and EUNavFor Sophia, as well as commercial shipping vessels, several NGOs active in the area also effect the rescue of thousands of migrants in the Central Mediterranean each day:

Data sources: European Commission, International Organisation for Migration
GOVERNMENT CRACKS DOWN ON FREE SPEECH IN MOROCCO

The Moroccan government has opted for a repressive response to grassroots protests by al-Hirak al-Shaabi, or Popular Movement, which have proliferated across the country’s northern Rif region since October 2016. Protestors across the region have gathered almost daily, demanding more development and condemning government corruption, repression of civil liberties and a high unemployment rate.

In late May 2017, riot police were deployed to stop the advance of thousands of people marching in the Moroccan city of al-Hoceima to demand the release of well-known activist and Hirak leader, Nasser Zefzafi. Following the issuance of a warrant for his arrest on 29 May, Zefzafi fled al-Hoceima. The state alleges he disrupted a prayer meeting at a local mosque. On 3 June, police encircled hundreds of protesters in a public park in al-Hoceima, stopping others from joining the demonstrators in their chant for “freedom, dignity and social justice.”

Zefzafi was taken into custody in early June as security forces made 87 additional arrests on various charges, including humiliating public officials and hostility towards the symbols of the monarchy. On 6 June, three Hirak members, including the administrator of the pro-Hirak Facebook page Rif24, were brought in for questioning. Morocco’s Interior Minister defended the crackdown on protests, saying that the “state had no choice but to enforce the law.”

Image courtesy Nicolas Raymond/Flickr
World attention for Somalia focuses on al-Shabaab

An impressive collection of East African heads of state met in London to discuss a Somali problem that affects them all – the terror reach of the al-Shabaab Islamic militants

When a nation loses functioning government but a population remains vulnerable to humanitarian crises and terrorism that easily spills across borders, neighbouring countries for their own well-being are obliged to step in and help fill the security void. In the case of Somalia, the army of Kenya – a country which has been victimised by attacks carried out by the Somali terror group al-Shabaab – has been pursuing militants within Somalia. However, Somalia’s instability is a regional crisis. No East African country has been spared an influx of Somali refugees, and no regional country is safe from possible al-Shabaab incursions.

In 2012, the UN with UK backing held the London Somalia Conference to bring together East Africa’s heads of state, top diplomats and foreign ministry officials to focus solely on the problems of their troubled neighbour. Five years later, a follow up summit, the London Somalia Conference 2017, was convened by the UN with the same UK sponsorship to assess progress and strategise how to overcome remaining challenges. The 2017 meeting, held between 11 and 13 May, was well attended by East African leadership and had a tone of encouragement that had been impossible to achieve in 2012.
REGIONAL FOCUS

EAST AFRICA

With the inauguration on 22 February of Somalia’s democratically elected President Mohamed Abdullahi ‘Farmajo’ Mohamed, known widely as President Farmajo, a functioning national government was again in place and capable of resuscitating long moribund governance institutions. The country’s national security is largely provided by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which enabled Farmajo – the first national official in a long time to feel sufficiently confident to venture from the relative safety of Mogadishu – to commence a symbolic National Reconciliation Tour. The outreach to villagers in the South West State was welcomed by Somalis who have borne the brunt of 26 years of vicious conflict and who have long felt isolated.

The London conference seeks to define federalism in Somalia

How the constituent states that make up the Somalia federation relate to the federal government, and how much power is retained by states versus the power invested in the national government including the Somali army, formed the crux of the 2017 London conference, held at London’s Lancaster House. That a federal government was now in place in Mogadishu allowed this discussion to take place as opposed to the imperative of 2012 to re-establish a federal government. States’ rights versus federal power has been the issue that has subverted other democracies, and the formula must be firmed in Somalia to ensure the country does not again fragment into feuding pieces and ultimately civil war.

States’ rights versus federal power has been the issue that has subverted other democracies, and the formula must be firmed in Somalia to ensure the country does not again fragment into feuding pieces and ultimately civil war.

Somali refugees in East Africa

Some 880,000 Somalis first fled civil war after the collapse of the central government in 1991; and then, since 2011, drought, famine and ongoing insecurity associated with al-Shabaab’s insurgency. A significant number journeyed across the Gulf of Aden into Yemen but around 625,000 refugees have settled in countries across East Africa.

Data source: UNHCR
Among security problems radiating out into East Africa from Somalia by land and sea, counter-insurgency efforts against al-Shabaab were considered along with strategies to counter the resurgence of sea piracy. Beginning with probes in early 2017 against an international armada patrolling the Horn of Africa, pirates put to sea by various local warlords after a lull of five years were again hijacking ships and kidnapping crews for ransom. Humanitarian concerns affecting the Somali population that, if not addressed, could set back nation-building efforts were on the agenda, including the reconstruction of Somalia’s health infrastructure and food aid in the wake of ongoing drought.

Among major leaders joining Somalia’s President Farmajo at the London Somalia 2017 conference were Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, Kenya President Uhuru Kenyatta, Uganda President Yoweri Museveni and UN Secretary-General António Guterres. The time-frame was established to enable Somalia to be a secure country with a revived economy by 2020. Again, the existence of a central government and reported advanced in the al-Shabaab counter-insurgency campaign make this date seem less fanciful than it would had it been proposed a mere six months earlier.

Building on national reconstruction progress achieved thus far

In the key field of national security, al-Shabaab’s terror attacks that are bedevilling the country, which primarily target AMISOM troops and Mogadishu hotels frequented by international visitors and journalists, are far from over but are not capable of causing national destruction. In other words, as deadly and debilitating as the loss of life and property continue to be, these attacks are not sufficient to topple the government or render the country lawless. The descent of Somalia into a failed state in the 1990s resulted from clashing warlords and political factions, not terrorist attacks. The former combatants are now partners in nation-rebuilding efforts. The aim of the London conference was an understanding where local power ends and federal power begins. Because security for the country also depends on interventions by international armed forces, the conference also reviewed al-Shabaab and piracy eradication efforts and strategised efforts to come.
Somalia’s economy requires international investors, and an absence of government revenue from taxation and other sources means donor aid is required both for emergency food relief in drought-hit areas and also for education and health infrastructure rehabilitation. A revived economy bringing job opportunities is the only hope for ending piracy, by offering livelihoods to the unemployed youth of coastal areas. The London conference devised a ‘New Partnership with Somalia’ programme to enlist international governments, investors and humanitarian donors to finance the country’s economic rehabilitation.

As deadly and debilitating as the loss of life and property continue to be, these attacks are not sufficient to topple the government or render the country lawless.

A new sense of optimism in a formerly forlorn country

Somalia is no longer Africa’s most desperate nation. That unfortunate status is now bestowed on South Sudan, which is torn by murderous ethnic-based political rivalries of the kind that once plagued Somalia. That Somalia has returned from the abyss of failed state status is a credit to resilient Somalis. That there is international goodwill eager to normalise the country was evident in the convening of the London summit. Just days before the event, President Farmajo declared a ‘national reconciliation initiative’ after visiting Afgoye, a town about 30 km outside Mogadishu. The president joined youth and women’s groups, elders of traditional structures and religious clerics to gather grass-roots opinions on a way forward for the nation. Of course, the issue preoccupying Somalis was a need for ‘liberation from the terrorist groups’. Beyond that, a desire existed to bring Somalis together, to patch up differences and end rivalries that led to civil war. Farmajo’s declaration of a National Reconciliation movement resulted. The effort will likely progress, given it originated with the Somalis themselves, eager for a safe, functioning country.
**ACM ANALYSIS IN BRIEF | Libya’s sea exodus: World attention for Somalia focuses on al-Shabaab**

The international community is fully supportive of Somalia’s comeback from ‘failed state’ status. Economic and security commitments were given to the country at the UN-initiated and UK-sponsored London Somalia Conference 2017 that was attended by East African heads of state.

**Key points:**
- Al-Shabaab terror attacks and renewed pirate activity remain major security concerns
- International commitment to restore Somalia to normalcy remains strong
- A federal government under democratically elected President Farmajo is in place as the essential element to restore Somalia’s economy and governance institutions

**RELEVANT READING ...**

- **‘Exit strategy: Challenges for the AU mission in Somalia’**
  The Somalia-based Heritage Institute for Policy Studies analyses AMISOM’s role in bringing stability to Somalia, as well as the challenges the mission faces in developing a successful exit strategy

- **“London Somalia Conference 11 May 2017”**
  The communique issued by the UK government gives an overview of the humanitarian, security and constitutional issues discussed at the London Conference on Somalia’s future

**COMMERCE COMMENTARY | Crackdown on China’s Africa predations**

Chinese nationals’ looting of natural resources, from raids on fisheries to illegal mining and poaching of endangered animals, has become a multi-billion-dollar business. African officials bribed to look the other way, or to actively assist, have benefitted at the expense of the continent’s economies and future. Two significant developments in May 2017 show the looting of African trade may not be invulnerable to law enforcement. Uganda ordered an investigation into its conservation and customs officials who colluded with Chinese embassy diplomats to use the country as a trans-shipment point for poached ivory from the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Beijing’s diplomats are not rogue operators, and the implication of Chinese officials reveals that Beijing has given its blessing to the looting. In South Africa, four South Africans were sentenced to 38 years in prison each for running a syndicate that sent tonnes of abalone illegally harvested from the country’s Western Cape waters to China. Once bountiful, the delicious shellfish are now close to becoming an endangered species in Southern Africa to due illegal poaching. Greater vigilance in protecting Africa’s natural bounty, even at the risk of upsetting Africa’s trade and development partner China, will continue to be required to safeguard Africa’s resources. - M.M.
INSIDE BIDI BIDI: THE WORLD’S LARGEST REFUGEE CAMP

About three million South Sudanese — a quarter of the population — have fled civil war and famine in their country. As conditions in South Sudan worsened, refugees have been streaming into neighbouring Uganda. By May 2017, Uganda was host to an estimated 875,000 South Sudanese refugees, with approximately 2,800 new arrivals each day. As a result of this influx, the main settlement area, Bidi Bidi, is now the largest refugee settlement in the world.

OPENED IN: AUGUST 2016 AND WAS BUILT IN JUST SIX MONTHS

LOCATION: NORTH-WEST UGANDA IN YUMBE DISTRICT, 40 KM FROM THE BORDER WITH SOUTH SUDAN

NUMBER OF REFUGEES HOSTED: 270,000 SOUTH SUDANÈSE LIVE IN THE CAMP ORIGINALLY DESIGNED TO HOUSE ABOUT 40,000

FUNDING REQUIREMENTS: US$ 109 MILLION IS NEEDED TO PROVIDE FULL RATIONS FOR THE MAY-OCTOBER PERIOD BUT ONLY US$ 49 MILLION HAD BEEN RECEIVED AS OF MAY 2017
Army mutiny in Côte d’Ivoire has all of Africa wondering about their armies’ finances

Infuriated by overdue pay and bonuses, disgruntled soldiers have created chaos in Côte d’Ivoire. As the tumult increased in May, Africans in all countries worried about the financing of their own armies.

Does Africans’ security extend only so far as the paychecks of the soldiers who are paid to protect them? Is chaos only one missed pay-check away? These were the unsettling questions pondered by Africans throughout the continent as mutinous soldiers created a security crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. While each African nation is unique, they all have professional armies in common, staffed by soldiers who take up military work as a livelihood rather than a selfless calling. Many impoverished countries struggle to meet their public worker payrolls. All African leaders know the consequences of not paying their armies on time. Many a coup d’état has been mounted by army leaders supported by disgruntled soldiers.

Unhappy soldiers have been swayed by rebel leaders who have emerged from army officer ranks seeking a political objective, such as taking over government or carving out sections of the country to run under their usurped authority. The degree of army discipline directly corresponds to the degree of professionalism in any military. One reason the militants of Nigeria’s Niger River Delta are being offered amnesty in an initiative to reintegrate them into civilian society rather than integrating them into the Nigerian Defence Force is because the rebels are ragtag, amateur militants without a culture of professionalism required for soldiers. However, soldiers involved in civil war conflicts in other Africa nations have been integrated into the victorious sides’ military. They transfer their allegiance from one military superior to another, while retaining their skills and code of professional conduct. Côte d’Ivoire chose to integrate over 8,000 rebel fighters into the now 22,000-personnel
national army, following the conclusion of the so-called Second Civil War of 2010-2011. The First Civil War occurred in 2002-2004. The rebel fighters helped install Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara, fighting to bring him to power. As a reward, they were given permanent soldiering jobs in the regular army. The rebellion from 12 to 16 May paralysed much of the country, and only in its aftermath can the wisdom of the integration plan be judged.

Soldiers involved in civil war conflicts in other Africa nations have been integrated into the victorious sides’ military. They transfer their allegiance from one military superior to another, while retaining their skills and code of professional conduct.

Unmet promises spark and then reignite a rebellion

Twice in 2017 mutinous soldiers, angered by the Ouattara government’s unfulfilled pay and bonus promises, set up roadblocks to shut highway transportation, besieged villages and otherwise intimidated civilians who still feel insecure from the frightening experience of the 2010-2011 civil war. Not all soldiers participated but rather only those who fought for Ouattara in the civil war and who were promised financial inducements to join the national army. On 6 January, the first roadblocks appeared and by the next day former rebel soldiers demonstrated or committed chaos and acts of intimidation in all regions of the country. When the protests hit Abidjan, the country’s commercial centre, government offered the mutineers a financial settlement that ended the brief but alarming uprising.

When the promised compensations did not materialise, 8,400 soldiers rose up again on 12 May. The tone was fiercer. Heavy gunfire erupted in various cities. The gunfire display was intended to be intimidating in urban areas. Soldiers blocked the border crossing with Burkina Faso. Business shut down in Abidjan. In an exchange of gunfire with loyalist soldiers in Bouake, three rebel soldiers were wounded on 13 May, and one died of his wounds the next day. On that day, 14 May, rebel soldiers opened fire in another display of intimidation, wounding six civilians.

With the strike action turned deadly, government made an accounting of its financial resources and gave the mutineers a deal with an immediate bonus payment of US$8,400 each and an additional payment to be made at the end of June 2017. The package was accepted, and the rebels re-joined the loyalist soldiers on 16 May. An interesting addendum occurred on 23 May, when roadblocks reappeared in Bouake, Côte d’Ivoire’s second largest city. Rebels were the culprits but with a difference: the protesters were former militants who had disarmed but had not joined the army. They demanded a compensation package identical to their former co-fighters in the military. Police used force to break up the barriers blocking access to Bouake, killing three protestors.

A region and continent concerned

Although other African countries have integrated rebel groups into their armed forces, others like Mali and Nigeria have not, choosing instead to offer amnesty to militants to turn in their weapons. The amnesty programmes are tied to financial incentives and training for employment and even counselling to ease the transition from bush fighting to life in civilian society.

Each country is unique, as is Côte d’Ivoire’s situation. However, West African regional heads of state conferring with Liberia’s President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf during the height of the May 2017 crisis expressed concern that the Côte d’Ivoire rebellion might spill across that country’s border. To a small degree this occurred, when mutinous soldiers blocked road access to Burkina Faso. A greater worry was that former rebels might again return to their erstwhile militancy and be angered if government does not fulfil its financial obligations to them, taking to the hills for a guerrilla insurgency, as happened in 2010. If such an insurgency sets up camp outside Côte d’Ivoire in neighbouring countries, this would unsettle those nations’ security. Such hostilities would inevitably trigger a refugee exodus of Ivorian people fleeing fighting or escaping villages in harm’s way. This would also burden other countries in the region and create a humanitarian crisis requiring the intervention of the UN Refugee Agency.

A greater worry was that former rebels might again return to their erstwhile militancy, and be angered if government does not fulfil its financial obligations to them, taking to the hills for a guerrilla insurgency.

Ivory Coast soldiers revolting over pay but may be politically hijacked. WA worried. Nigeria army chief warns his troops against politicking.
Many of Côte d’Ivoire’s mutinous soldiers herald from former rebel groups, such as the Forces Nouvelles, or New Forces of Côte d’Ivoire, active during the Ivorian civil wars and subsequently assimilated into the country’s national army. 

**Above:** Forces Nouvelles rebels stride through an Ivorian town secured by the French Foreign Legion during the civil war in 2004. **Below:** The Chief of Staff of the Forces Nouvelles reviews his troops at Odienné.

*Photos courtesy Jonathan Alpeyrie/Wikimedia Commons; Zenman/Wikimedia Commons*
In larger terms, the linking of national security to government’s ability to pay soldiers is a common concern throughout Africa. All but the most affluent governments face periodic cash flow problems. However, no country should be shot up the way Côte d’Ivoire has been because of unpaid soldiers. One solution would be greater power for labour unions representing security personnel. In the name of national security, governments, as a rule, do not allow their police and soldiers to strike. However, some nations do allow labour organisations to bargain on behalf of security personnel over wages, working conditions, housing and other work-related issues. For countries where the unions are not allowed at present, these bodies must be permitted to operate. Once soldiers feel they have a voice that will be heard by governments and have an outlet to express their grievances through negotiations, there will be far less cause to resort to taking up arms when issues arise.

ACM ANALYSIS IN BRIEF | Army mutiny in Côte d’Ivoire has all of Africa wondering about their armies’ finances

If loss of security for a nation is only one missed pay-check away, many African governments that face cash flow problems are worried by events in Côte d’Ivoire. One solution is to increase police and security forces’ collective bargaining arrangements with governments.

Key points:

- While the integration of rebel soldiers into Côte d’Ivoire’s national army after the 2010-2011 civil war ended might have been a good idea, the rebels’ acceptance was conditional on cash bonuses
- When bonuses were not paid, a mutiny occurred in January 2017, and when government pay commitments were still not realised, rebellion was renewed in May 2017
- Soldiers in African countries are forbidden to strike; however, if represented by unions that can raise grievances via collective bargaining, they will feel as if they have an alternative to mutiny when problems grow intolerable

RELEVANT READING ...

- “To consolidate this peace of ours” – A Human rights agenda for Côte d’Ivoire’
  A Human Rights Watch report examining President Ouattara’s failure to properly address some of the underlying social issues that led to past conflicts - http://bit.ly/23jSaiz

- ‘Côte d’Ivoire: IMF Country Report’
  An International Monetary Fund report, detailing the economic challenges facing Côte d’Ivoire despite strong economic growth - http://bit.ly/2dBjACg

COMMERCE COMMENTARY | Disappearing coastline a slow-motion West Africa disaster

Creeping environmental degradation is harming business and economies all along Africa’s coastlines, including island nations. Nowhere is the damage more severe than Senegal, whose coastline is vanishing at a rate of up to two metres yearly. Some of the beachfront property is eroded by storms made more ferocious by global warming. Theft of sand or overly aggressive legal mining of sand for construction purposes is a major contributor. National development is suffering as roads are undermined and must be rebuilt further inland, along with ocean-front buildings. West Africa looks to tourism as a sustainable growth industry into the future, but has failed to address the destruction of its coastline, which offers a primary tourism attraction. - M.M.

INVESTOR INSIGHTS:

The Ouattara government would be wise to pay the army, while making it clear that future mutinies will not be tolerated, for any reason. For Côte d’Ivoire’s long-term stability, the professionalisation of the military, and removal of its power from politics, is imperative. For this reason, the military would further be wise to slowly and quietly strip power from the mutiny leaders and begin to integrate the former rebel soldiers into the broader ranks, so as to prevent future uprisings from taking place. For investors, equity risk premia and local debt should now require an additional risk premium for this new threat of instability, though this may already be priced in. Year to date, 2024 Ivoirian sovereign debt has already opened a nearly 3% spread vis-à-vis similar duration Senegalese paper. - A.C.
THE EUROPEAN UNION

On 5 June 2017, the European Union (EU) committed US$ 56 million to establishing a multi-national task force to fight terrorism in the Sahel. The region has seen the emergence in recent years of a myriad of jihadist groups, some linked to al-Qaeda and Islamic State. The Francophone countries of the Sahel – Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger collectively known as the Sahel G-5 – agreed in 2015 to establish the task force with the aim of improving regional co-operation to tackle jihadist terrorism. However, the implementation of the plan has lagged, partly due to funding obstacles. The task force comprising troops from the Sahel G-5 countries is expected to become operational by the end of 2017 and will reinforce the French and UN peacekeeping troops already stationed in the region. French President Emmanuel Macron, who visited Mali in his first official trip outside Europe in May, called on other European countries to provide additional military assistance and development aid to the region.

International military presence in the Sahel:

FRANCE

4,000 French troops have been deployed across the G-5 countries since 2013

UNITED NATIONS

15,209 uniformed personnel are stationed in Mali as part of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

Data sources: European Union, United Nations. Image courtesy US Army Africa/Flickr
Ebola returns to Africa in a dangerously unstable Democratic Republic of Congo

Having a deadly disease breakout in a dangerous, unstable country is the world health community’s worst nightmare. It is playing out in reality in Central Africa.

The World Health Organisation (WHO) is putting the best face on the outbreak declared in April of a deadly, incurable disease that became more virulent in May. “This is not the first Ebola outbreak,” said WHO spokesperson Christian Lindmeier. “This is the eighth Ebola epidemic in the Congo; it will not shake the population,” said Oly Ilunga Kalenga, Public Health Minister for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
The trouble is, Kalenga works for the demonstrably mendacious administration of DRC strongman Joseph Kabila, whose priority is not with national security against either a health crisis or a deadly militant uprising in the Kasai Region, which is further fragmenting a long-tattered nation. Kabila’s priority is to remain in power. Kabila is content to concede management of Ebola containment to the WHO. That containment is significantly complicated by an insurgency in the Kasai region and a national transportation and healthcare infrastructure that have deteriorated under Kabila’s rule. The DRC is not Guinea, Liberia or Sierra Leone, where other Ebola outbreaks alarmed the world in recent years. Those nations were more stable, and governments were, in large measure, responsive to their people’s needs. An Ebola outbreak in a country like the DRC is the worst health scenario that can occur in Africa and would be similar to such an outbreak occurring in other unstable nations, like Central African Republic, Libya or South Sudan.

The epidemic, first discovered in DRC, resists eradication

Ebola is a particularly fearful disease, whose horrific symptoms lead to fatalities in most cases. Contact with an infected person or objects on which infected blood or body fluids is present can lead to contagion. The ease with which the disease is spread is coupled to the ease with which infected individuals who have yet to show symptoms travel from country to country and use air transportation from continent to continent. In 2014, more than 11,300 West Africans were killed by the incurable disease in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. About 28,600 people were infected with Ebola. The economies of Liberia and Sierra Leone were virtually shut down, particularly in Liberia, which was at the expense of economic progress made after the country’s ruinous 14-year civil war, concluded in 2003.
The DRC has had several Ebola outbreaks, the most recent killing 42 people in 2014. The frequency of outbreaks is attributed to the DRC’s internal conflicts, both political and armed warfare of militant groups. A two-generational Kabila regime has prioritised the enrichment of the family dynasty by exploiting the public and private sectors for personal family gain, rather than conclusively confronting militant uprisings, redressing the grievances of neglected parts of the country that give rise to militant groups, or improving public amenities. One of the world’s richest countries in terms of natural resources, the DRC has seen these resources looted by local politicians in concert with foreign groups and nations, such as Rwanda. The result can be seen in Kinshasa, where a gleaming central business district contrasts with fetid slums ringing the capital. Given such national governance, and the lawless state of areas where militants maraud, conditions exist for the spread of disease. The country’s national health infrastructure is damaged, and the political will from leadership to commit to the public welfare is missing. The result is the recurrence of Ebola, to the alarm of neighbouring countries. As soon as the DRC Ebola outbreak was declared by the WHO on 12 May 2017, African nations began screening air passengers from DRC.

In April, nine people in the Bas-Uele province in the DRC’s north contracted haemorrhagic fever. Of the three who subsequently died, two were suspected to have succumbed to Ebola, while the third tested positive for the disease.

The frequency of outbreaks is attributed to the DRC’s internal conflicts, both political and armed warfare of militant groups.

Not the first Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Since Ebola was first recognised in the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire) in 1976, the country has had the most separate Ebola outbreaks of any in which the disease has ever occurred. The outbreak in 2017 will bring the total number of Ebola outbreaks in the DRC to eight.

<table>
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<th>Deaths</th>
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<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fatality rate

Data source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
The virulence of the highly contagious Ebola virus makes outbreaks a challenge to maintain, especially in countries like the DRC, where health systems and infrastructure are underdeveloped and neglected. Above: A colour-enhanced electron micrograph of Ebola virus particles. Below: Dr Peter Githua in personal protective equipment as he heads to the red zone of an Ebola treatment unit in Sinje, Grand Cape Mount County, Liberia.

Photos courtesy Thomas W. Geisbert, Boston University School of Medicine/Wikimedia Commons; UNMEER/Flickr
An additional death was announced the following week, as 27 more people became confirmed Ebola cases. The disease’s epicentre was Likati, 1,300 km from Kinshasa.

The Kasai Crisis typifies DRC’s instability

In fighting with local rebels in Kasai Central province, government had reportedly killed 400 and displaced about 220,000 villagers during the final months of 2016. In February 2017, 84 militants were killed during a three-day period in Tshimbulu where they were placed in mass graves. The rebel movement evolved out of the impoverished area’s resentment at neglect from the central government. The Kabila regime responded to this affront to its authority not by addressing local concerns but with a brutal crackdown. Although the United Nations’ Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) has no mandate to address underlying social problems that have led to conflict, the body’s presence does inhibit more egregious killing by the military. Kabila wants MONUSCO out of the country, which would be particularly disadvantageous as the DRC heads toward perilous national elections in 2018. MONUSCO’s mandate was set to expire on 31 March 2017. The day before, the UN Security Council voted to extend the mission’s presence in the DRC. Troop levels were reduced by 2,600, leaving a peacekeeping force of 16,215.

The cause of government’s neglect of the Kasai region is no secret. The area gave birth to the main opposition leader, Étienne Tshisekedi, whose Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDSP) political party dominates the region’s politics. Tshisekedi died of natural causes on 1 February 2017, having led the opposition push against Kabila’s hold on power. The current crisis is a result of government’s refusal to recognise the area’s traditional hereditary chief, who Kabila’s group feel is too close to the UDSP opposition. In August 2016, security forces raided the chief’s home, ostensibly on a weapons’ search. The act was seen as aggression and sacrilege, and an anti-government guerrilla group was soon formed as a response. Under international pressure following mass killings in January and February, government came to terms with the insurgency, including reparations for the families of those killed. The uprising has added fuel to a nationwide displeasure with Kabila’s continuing hold on power and shows the vulnerability of the country to local insurgencies. The unstable political environment complicates anti-Ebola efforts.

Vaccines may end the emergency

Ebola was for the first time identified as a new disease in the DRC in 1976. While the country has not improved conditions to allow Ebola’s final eradication there, medical science has been at work on an experimental vaccine that the WHO will press into use if the Likati outbreak spreads. Some 300,000 doses can be made available to the DRC government.

Kabila has committed to stepping down after the 2018 elections, which he has succeeded in postponing for two years. His presence is a destabilising factor in the country. The Ebola crisis will not quicken his departure; rather, his presence will exacerbate the Ebola crisis. The lesson is clear for a continent that is experiencing disease outbreaks of increasing frequency. Stable countries and responsive governments are required to thwart international epidemics.
RELEVANT READING ...

- ‘Conflict and emerging infectious diseases’
The Centers for Disease Control discusses the major challenges to detection and control of infectious diseases in conflict situations, including inadequate surveillance and response systems, destroyed infrastructure and collapsed health systems - http://bit.ly/2qVFHbQ

- ‘Pushed to the limit and beyond: A year into the largest ever Ebola outbreak’
Doctors Without Borders provides a detailed account of the 2014 West African Ebola outbreak that exposed the reality of how inefficient and slow health and aid systems are to respond to such exceptional emergencies - http://bit.ly/1ECvzBb
Main players:
Two offshoot factions of the now-disbanded Séléka rebel group, a largely Muslim alliance that overthrew the government in 2013, are battling for control in the Ouaka and Hautte-Koto regions in south-eastern Central African Republic (CAR). The Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) is comprised of fighters from the Fulani ethnic group. The Popular Front for the Renaissance (FPRC) is a loose coalition of rebel groups primarily from the Gula and Runga ethnic communities, and includes elements of the anti-Balaka, formerly the Séléka’s bitter rivals.

Timeline of events:
Since the beginning of May 2017: 88,000 people have been displaced in the CAR in resurgent fighting.
7–9 May: At least 56 people were killed and over 11,000 displaced in clashes between rebel groups in the town of Alindao.
8 May: Five UN peacekeepers were killed in an attack on the village of Yogofongo.
12–14 May: Anti-Balaka rebels attacked civilians, aid workers and UN peacekeepers, killing 115 people, in the town of Bangassou.
15–18 May: 41,409 of the 47,500 inhabitants of Bria were forcibly displaced by fighting between the UPC and FPRC.

Data source: UN, various agencies
In Zambia, fears grow of another African autocrat

President Lungu’s primary political function is to reach out to opposition after a contested election. Instead, he is fanning the flames of conflict.

Neither the winning nor the losing sides in Zambia’s 2016 elections have acted admirably. Angry that their claims of vote rigging were not addressed to their satisfaction, the opposition has refused to recognise the administration of Edgar Lungu as legitimate and has staged violent demonstrations. Lungu has a special obligation to be conciliatory and to extend an olive branch to opponents for the sake of national development. Instead, Lungu has shown immaturity in rhetoric and actions. Rather than champion reconciliation, he has threatened a state of emergency. Government’s most egregious action was the arrest of Zambia’s main opposition leader, Hakainde Hichilema, who narrowly lost to Lungu in the August 2016 poll. Hichilema’s vehicle was allegedly blocking the presidential motorcade in an April 2017 incident. Rather than charging the politician with a traffic offense or for disobeying a police order, government prosecutors arrested and charged Hichilema with treason, a crime that carries the death penalty.

The convoluted reasoning given by prosecutors against Hichilema was that the traffic altercation might have led to injury or even the death of the head of state, and thus Hichilema was guilty of attempted assassination, which is an act of treason against government, justifying a death sentence.
The draconian charge and the ridiculousness of the prosecution’s argument was so outrageous that, for the first time since Lungu’s inauguration, critical international attention was cast on Zambia. The question on the global community’s mind: in a Southern Africa region teetering between governance by despots, like Angola’s dos Santos and Zimbabwe’s Mugabe, and progressive democracies, like Botswana and Namibia, is Zambia taking a step backward with another autocrat helming government?

A disputed election renders Zambia politically unstable

After Zambia’s President Michael Sata died in office in October 2014, Sata’s Minister of Defence, Edgar Lungu, was chosen by the ruling Patriot Front (PF) party to contest a presidential by-election to fill the remainder of Sata’s term. The January 2015 contest saw Lungu narrowly defeat Hakainde Hichilema of the United Party for National Development (UPND). Those same candidates went head-to-head the following year when the next general election was held. Lungu acquired about 100,000 votes more than Hichilema in the August 2016 poll. The opposition was suspicious that the vote count brought Lungu just above the 50% mark, which meant no additional run-off election was required. Refusing to concede defeat, the opposition filed a case with the Constitutional Court. Although the UPND presented evidence of election irregularities that the party claimed invalidated the ballot, the court ruled to let the results stand. Lungu was sworn in on 13 September 2016 to a full five-year term.

The opposition refused to honour the rules of democracy, which require election losers to abide by court decisions despite their disappointment or conviction that election fraud had occurred. Honouring democratic institutions like the courts is essential if democracy is to take root, and opposition parties have the option of reversing election results at the next election by gaining voter support. Instead, the Zambian press − supportive of the UPND − mounted a relentless attack on Lungu’s credibility, describing him as a dictator even before his inauguration. Violent demonstrations that followed Hichilema’s arrest were encouraged by party officials.

Lungu employs state security against his opposition

Lungu’s reaction to the opposition’s challenge to his legitimacy was excessive and as damaging to Zambia’s democratic institutions as the opposition’s recalcitrance. A cloud has hung over Lungu’s personal integrity since 2010, when he was disbarred from practicing law. His law license was suspended by the Law Association of Zambia after he was found guilty of professional misconduct. After his rise to the presidency, government has repeatedly threatened to disband the Law Society.

Despite his vendetta against the Law Society, Lungu told Zambians at his inauguration, “There is no time and latitude to settle scores.” He then employed police state tactics in a raid on Hichilema’s home. Four other opposition leaders were rounded up and also charged with treason, which allowed the state to hold them without bail and forbade the defendants outside medical care. When UPND supporters took to the streets, committing arson and property damage, Lungu did not choose to calm the waters but rather stoked the conflict with inflammatory comments. “I will not hesitate to declare a state of emergency,” he said, seemingly unconcerned that a state of emergency is the favoured tool of African autocrats to repress political opposition. The declaration always comes at great cost to developing democracies. The UPND opined that Lungu was “looking for an excuse” to declare a state of emergency and give himself martial law powers.
Lungu was first elected president of Zambia after the unexpected death in office of Michael Sata in October 2014. 

Above: Zambians queue to cast their votes in the election that first brought Lungu to power. Below: Lungu’s first inauguration ceremony was held in Lusaka on 25 January 2015.

Photos courtesy GovernmentZA/Flickr; Adam Ojdahl/ Flickr
A neutral body was required to examine the complaints and abuses of both sides of the political divide. The Zambia Conference of Catholic Bishops, led by Archbishop Telesphore Mpundu of Lusaka, offered to mediate between government and the opposition. In a statement issued on 27 April, the bishops came down hard on the “unprofessional and brutal conduct” of police, who employed arbitrary arrests and “horrific torture of suspects.” Both Lungu’s administration and the UPND were guilty of “careless, inflammatory and divisive statements.” However, government’s position was the most dangerous, the bishops found, because “anyone who criticises the government for wrongdoing is sure to have the police unleashed on him or her.”

Most alarming for Zambian democracy was the bishops’ verdict that the country’s judiciary was not independent. The courts “let the country down by failing to stand up

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**Autocracy from democracy in Zambia**

Zambian President Edgar Lungu’s authoritarian tendencies have not gone unnoticed by international rights watchdog Freedom House, which recorded a decline from 2016 in both political and civil liberties in the country.

**PARTLY FREE**

2016: 60/100**

2017: 56/100

Zambia 2016:
- Political rights: 3/7*
- Civil liberties: 4/7*

Zambia 2017:
- Political rights: 4/7*
- Civil liberties: 4/7*

* Freedom rating (1= best / 7= worst)
**Overall score (1= worst / 100 = best)

Data source: Freedom House Freedom in the World reports 2016 and 2017
to political manipulation and corruption," the bishops said. "Our democratic credentials have all but vanished in this nation. There is fear and trembling among the people, shown in the way they are afraid to speak out against injustice."

Mediation will calm the opposition and provide a check on Lungu's autocratic drift

A national mediation, conducted by the country’s bishops, who have made that offer, could prove as effective as a similar effort undertaken by Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) Catholic bishops. The DRC bishops acted as intermediaries in December 2016 between President Joseph Kabila and the country’s opposition parties, successfully negotiating a timetable for Kabila’s departure. However, Lungu’s ruling PF party is in a combative mood. In May, party officials implied that Hichilema was a sinner in need of divine intervention when they called for a national prayer on his behalf. The UPND correctly complained that the ruling party was mocking them and their leadership who were jailed on trumped-up charges. After police brutalised the opposition physically, government was literally adding insult to injury.

ACM ANALYSIS IN BRIEF | In Zambia, fears grow of another African autocrat

Lungu disdains national reconciliation in favour of using police and the courts to attack the political opposition and settle scores. A new African autocrat appears to be coming of age.

Key points:
- An independent group of Catholic Bishops condemned police for creating fear in the country and brutalising government’s political opponents
- The Zambian courts show signs of surrendering their independence to Lungu’s administration
- Top opposition leaders have been arrested for treason, a crime punishable by death, for committing a traffic offense, sparking nationwide violent protests that invite further repression from government

RELEVANT READING ...

- 'Democracy, human rights, and governance'
  USAID describes how Zambia has had a record of democratic and free elections and peaceful transitions of power but indicates that there remains a need to promote better governance and reinforce democratic practices - http://bit.ly/2scQRXr

- 'Zambia 2016/2017'
  Amnesty International documents human rights abuses by the Zambian government, including repression of freedom of expression, assembly and association and a crackdown on independent media - http://bit.ly/2qyfrAU

COMMERCE COMMENTARY | Zimbabwe labour migration harmful to Southern Africa

An estimated three million Zimbabweans have been forced out of their country as economic migrants by the failed economic policies of their country’s government. This labour and brain drain is not only devastating to Zimbabwe, but is not assisting other Southern African nations where the migrants settle. These other countries are struggling to find employment for their own nationals, and in the case of South Africa, Zimbabweans are amongst the principal targets of periodic ‘xenophobic violence’, as poor, jobless South Africans, frustrated by their own government’s poor job-creation and poverty alleviation record, turn on migrant labourers as scapegoats. - M.M.

INVESTOR INSIGHTS:

The markets do not share the same level of pessimism in Zambia. Though the local currency, the kwacha, sold off sharply amid the 2015 collapse in commodity prices, it has since regained some of its strength, having appreciated nearly 30% following its November 2015 lows, and is showing little sign of concern for the political noise. Debt markets seem similarly unconcerned and Zambian government bonds have significantly outpaced many of their regional and broader emerging market peers year to date. So, for investors who believe that such optimism is unwarranted, there still appears to be plenty of space on the short side of the book. - A.C.
Thomas Thabane’s All Basotho Convention (ABC) won the plurality of votes in Lesotho’s snap election held on 3 June 2017. The election – the third in five years – was called after Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili lost a no-confidence vote in parliament in March, requiring the legislature to be dissolved. Perennial instability has come to characterise the coalition governments that have been assembled since 2012 in order to conform to Lesotho’s complicated, mixed member proportional representation system of governance. Lesotho’s democratic processes remain fragile.

26 May 2012: The incumbent Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili’s Democratic Congress (DC) won the majority of single-member seats in the year’s scheduled election. However, the DC did not win enough seats to form a government outright and, for the first time in Lesotho’s history, a coalition government had to be formed.

8 June 2012: Despite losing the election, Thomas Thabane succeeded Mosisili as Prime Minister by building a coalition government with the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) and the Basotho National Party (BNP).

28 February 2015: Fresh elections were held after in-fighting saw the collapse of Thabane’s coalition and the dissolution of parliament. Thabane narrowly lost the election to Mosisili, who regained power after Deputy Prime Minister Mothetjoa Metsing of the LCD crossed over to join Mosisili in a new coalition government.

1 March 2017: Thabane’s ABC was joined by several other parties in passing a no-confidence vote against Mosisili whose seven-party coalition had collapsed when the DC’s deputy leader defected with several sitting DC Members of Parliament to form the Alliance of Democrats (AD).

3 June 2017: Thabane won 48 of 120 parliamentary seats. Mosisili won 30 seats. As Thabane’s ABC did not win the 61 seats required for forming a government outright, a coalition government will again have to be formed.

A full analysis of Lesotho’s coalition government installed on 18 June 2017 and Lesotho’s tenuous fate as an independent nation coming up in the July 2017 edition of ACM.

Data source: Various agencies, photo courtesy GovernmentZA/Flickr
The manufacturing sector contributes about 15 percent of gross domestic product and is vital for creating employment in an economy where on average one in four people has been unable to find work for over a decade. With this in mind, South Africa plans to spend 5.8 billion rand over the next three years to help manufacturers affected by the global economic downturn upgrade their factories, improve products and train workers.

The dti, the Manufacturing Circle, the Department of Science and Technology, the Department of Public Enterprises and the City of Ekurhuleni are pleased to bring you the 4th annual Manufacturing Indaba. The forum will bring together business owners, industry leaders, government officials, capital providers and professional experts to discuss challenges, explore opportunities and brainstorm solutions critical to industrial development of the South African economy.

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www.manufacturingindaba.co.za
While the challenge to African democracies of leaders who cling to power and abuse their office is not restricted to Southern Africa, Angola, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe each present their own variations on how democratic constitutions are corrupted by strongmen (Angola, Zimbabwe) or are now under threat of such corruption (South Africa and Zambia). ACM asked Alida Kok, a South African political theorist and lecturer in political sciences at the University of South Africa in Pretoria and a political columnist for South Africa’s Beeld newspaper, to compare and contrast these leaders and their respective counties’ democratic institutions.

We’ve witnessed Robert Mugabe’s move from Zimbabwe’s liberator to its President for Life, and now there are signs from Zambia’s President Edgar Lungu of the same autocratic tendencies. Is there a transformative danger that affects democratic politicians who assume power on a continent with a history of authoritarianism?

In order to compare the situations in Zambia and Zimbabwe, one has to consider the importance of the political party as a unit of analysis. In our analyses of the politics in the region, political parties can often be regarded as the property of a party leader or a dominant party faction. As a result, individual leaders (like presidents Edgar Lungu and Robert Mugabe) and their factions tend to receive more attention, but the ways in which political parties behave provide us with valuable insights on political mobilisation and the use of the “democratic plumbing” in Southern African multi-party democracies.

Democracy as a system of pipes in society, or “plumbing”, is a peculiar analogy, but seeing it in this way highlights a main characteristic in the consideration of democracy: is a structure – a system of pipes or plumbing – present that can relieve pressure in the system in one way or another? The constitution provides the blueprint for the layout of the plumbing. For example, if the legislative power struggles, on its part, to hold the executive accountable, will the pressure created in the system as a result of this be relieved elsewhere within the parameters of the constitution? Does the system provide a space for a public sphere to flourish? If not, in which other spaces do people interact with each other and resolve their differences, and how does the plurality of a multi-party democracy become manifest (if not in the public sphere)?
Political parties are some of the main role players that have to utilise democratic plumbing and are often the weak links that create blockages in or erode the system.

Political parties are some of the main role players that have to utilise democratic plumbing, and parties, as we have seen in the case of the Patriotic Front (PF) in Zambia and ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe, are often the weak links that create blockages in or erode the system. The Zambian democracy is now eroding more noticeably (after the announcement of a State of Emergency and the arrest of an opposition leader indications are that blockages will not be relieved quickly), while the Zimbabwean democracy fell away to make place for an authoritarian system.

How would you compare the two countries politically?

In the comparison between the Zambian and Zimbabwean systems, I would like to refer to the classification made by Khabele Matlosa (from the Department of Political Affairs at the African Union Commission). Matlosa classifies Zambia as an “electoral democratic regime” and Zimbabwe as an “electoral authoritarian regime”.

Zambia as an electoral democratic regime has moved from dictatorial rule to a “multi-party democratic dispensation” (Matlosa 2017), but democracy has not yet consolidated here (like it has in Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa and the Seychelles, for example). The Zambian democratic plumbing is, therefore, currently in the making. The ruling party in Zambia is not a “liberation party” that still holds power – as in the case of Zimbabwe – and as a result the “clamp down” on the public sphere is not as severe. The public sphere is still characterised by plurality.

Zimbabwe, as an electoral authoritarian regime, is a “façade democracy.” It pretends to have democratic plumbing by means of, for example, holding elections. However, the ZANU-PF as liberation party that is still in power has obliterated the official public sphere and utilises ideology and terror to keep corruption and neopatrimonialism in place.

Signs from a protest demonstration in London demand that elections demand that elections in Zimbabwe be free and fair, reflecting the will of the electorate. Zimbabwe holds regular elections but these serve merely to legitimise the rule of dictator Robert Mugabe.

Image courtesy Ben Sutherland/Flickr
What is your assessment of Angola, in terms of leadership versus democracy, the country as “dos Santos Incorporated” as it were?

Neopatrimonialism is an informal patron-client relationship – or a system of social hierarchy – where patrons and their clients abuse state resources for their personal benefit. In Angola, the system of social hierarchy has been made official by President José Eduardo dos Santos after he appointed his daughter as the head of state energy firm, Sonangol. His son is also the chief executive of Angola’s sovereign wealth fund.

The blatant flow of state resources to “dos Santos Incorporated” and the ways in which “real power is negotiated and bargained at extra-constitutional level” (Roque 2009) in Angola today is possible because the ruling party – the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) – has effectively consolidated its hegemony in decisive moves against its opponents since 1975. Added to this, the opposition in Angola has failed more than once to convince voters that it could provide an alternative to the MPLA. Due to the failure of the opposition, and the MPLA’s power, Angola remains authoritarian and not democratic.

The opposition in Angola has failed more than once to convince voters that it could provide an alternative to the MPLA. Due to the failure of the opposition, and the MPLA’s power, Angola remains authoritarian and not democratic.

In South Africa’s case, Africa’s most progressive democracy is showing resiliency against state capture efforts by the Zuma administration, seen in reactions by the courts, the media, opposition groups and some ANC leadership. How do you envision a post-Zuma ANC and nation?

South Africa is currently in a third “phase of transformation” since the early 1990s. The first phase of transformation that took place was the downfall of apartheid and the move towards democracy (1990
to, more or less, 1997 when the Constitution took effect), and the second phase of transformation was the ANC Polokwane conference in 2007 (that led to the election of Jacob Zuma as number one on the ANC party list) and the general election that followed it in 2009 during which Jacob Zuma was voted in as South African President.

A phase of transformation is characterised by uncertainty and the abuse of power. One can also think of a phase of transformation – in this context – as a “black hole” in which people are not at all times held accountable for their actions.

Think, for example, of the transformation in the early 1990s from apartheid to democracy. Selected groups and individuals that benefited from the system that was ending (apartheid) abused their power to receive a few last gains “before their time ended.” This is also the case in the current phase of transformation and the neopatrimonial and criminal structures that are feeding off the state are slowly becoming exposed in the South African media and elsewhere.

To determine the character of a post-Zuma ANC and nation, my sense would be to look at the transformations of the past and what followed it. Even in the light of shocking power abuse by the executive, South Africa’s democracy is still slowly working towards consolidation (many commentators are of the opinion that a democracy is only truly consolidated when a former opposition party becomes the ruling party). The country’s democratic plumbing is improving, and South Africa is becoming more fit through democracy. There needs to exist a great pressure (President Zuma and the neopatrimonial structures that surround him) for us to know that we can make use of our democratic plumbing to relieve that great pressure.

RELEVANT READING ...

- ‘Betrayal of the promise: How South Africa is being stolen’

- ‘The future of African democracy’
  The Institute for Security Studies argues that democracy in Africa will only contribute to development and growth if such key aspects of electoral democracy as individual freedoms, political equality, an independent civil society and a free press are realised - http://bit.ly/2rXD9Jc

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ACM Country Profile: Egypt
Assessing the political, business and economic impacts of conflict

Egypt faces significant threats to national security from a terrorist insurgency. In response, the government of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has become autocratic and repressive of freedoms for ordinary Egyptians, while simultaneously undertaking economic reforms that attracted increased foreign investment in 2017. However, Egyptians are burdened by historically high inflation and cuts in government subsidies.

Political Assessment:
Under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Egypt has become an increasingly totalitarian nation. Human rights are compromised under a military-minded administration that deems civilian freedoms secondary to national security concerns. There is no doubt that Egypt faces serious security threats. The Israel-Palestinian conflict has spilled over into Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, and dozens of soldiers have been killed in the region since 2016. Twin bombings, claimed by the Islamic State that killed more than 30 people at two Coptic Christian churches on 9 April 2017, prompted Sisi to declare a three-month State of Emergency. However, Sisi uses the threat of Islamist extremism to justify cracking down on his political opposition and government critics. The State of Emergency has now essentially legitimated what human rights groups consider longstanding, widespread and systematic torture, enforced disappearances and extra-legal killings of civilians carried out by the state in what it considers the more important battle against terrorism. A new law, ratified by Sisi on 27 April, granting the president the power to appoint top-level judges, could also further undermine the independence of Egypt’s judiciary.

Business Assessment:
Egypt’s ever-expanding offering of antiquities continues to attract tourists, while the government’s extensive economic reform programme has aided in bringing back foreign investment that dipped in the wake of the upheaval of the 2011 revolution. The newly rehabilitated Suez Canal, doubled in size and capacity to handle traffic, demonstrated its profitability in 2016, its first full year of operation. An educated populace provides a skilled and technically qualified workforce for Egypt’s strong industrial, manufacturing and technology sectors. Nonetheless, investors are wary of a complex and overly bureaucratic business regulation system that has contributed to Egypt’s rank of 122nd out of 190 countries in the World Bank’s 2017 Ease of Doing Business Index. New investment and industrial licensing laws passed by parliament in May 2017, designed to cut red tape, provide tax incentives, reduce licensing time and improve dispute settlement, will do much to appease investors, facilitate exports and increase industrial production. Greater protection for investors is now also afforded by the country’s first ever bankruptcy law, passed in January 2017.

Economic Assessment:
In a bid to revive an economy crippled by a foreign currency shortage and to secure a much-needed US$ 12 billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan conditioned on economic reform, the government floated the national currency, the Egyptian pound, in November 2016. The decision, which devalued the currency by almost half and Egyptian stocks by a third, proved wildly successful going into 2017. Investors swooped in with buying that boosted the pound’s value by 15% by February. Stocks jumped and foreign holdings of Egyptian treasury bills doubled from US$ 700 million in December 2016 to US$ 1.4 billion in January 2017. With the foreign exchange shortage resolved, government will have to turn its attention to lowering inflation, which soared to above 30% after the pound’s floatation. While struggling with rising prices, consumers have also been hit with the removal of government fuel and electricity price subsidies as part of spending cuts that were vital to the IMF deal. However, the government’s economic reform programme does include the expansion of social protection measures for the country’s vulnerable citizens, as well as initiatives aimed at making it easier for women to work outside the home.
Africa’s population boom presents renewed opportunities for conflict

African nations that have pushed family planning have seen economic and social benefits while countries with booming populations remain mired in poverty, which produces crime, social unrest and opportunities for terrorists to exploit social misery.

Africa’s population crisis has dropped from public discourse, NGO and social welfare agendas and, apparently, government awareness. The alarm common in the 1970s through 1990s, when out-of-control population growth was taken seriously as a threat to African’s present-day security and future existence, has dissipated. And yet, the dangers that high populations present to nations’ security, both today and accelerating into the future, are enormous. Economic growth cannot elevate the standard of living for the average person because a GDP rise of 3% cannot compensate for an annual population rise of 5%. The demographic of the poor produces the most children. Rural families existing on subsistence farming require manual labour, and family members are required to do this work. High infant and maternal mortality rates encourage the impulse toward greater child-bearing.
World population growth to 2050

Data source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division
Concurrently, an expanding population of the poor puts pressure on public services that are unable to cope with rising numbers of users and ensures that unemployment remains high. Urban township slums proliferate, and overwhelmed schools provide ever-declining quality of education.

Into this social misery comes the traditional plagues of society: disease, crime, political disharmony and terrorism. Having grown from the social chaos of Somalia, the Islamic militant group al-Shabaab successfully recruits over the border in Kenya from that country’s pool of unemployed youth who respond to the jihadist call as an antidote to the hopelessness they feel. Africa’s other principal terror group, Nigeria’s Boko Haram, also grew from the ranks of the poor and disenfranchised. The chances of the Islamic State recruiting further in northern Africa will be determined by the ability of regional economic growth to reduce unemployment and poverty. However, as African countries that have encouraged family planning show, economic growth and poverty reduction are benefits.

The population bomb of the 21st century slowly explodes in Africa

The phrase ‘population bomb’ was coined in the 1960s, when advances in medical science and agriculture resulted in high increases in populations, particularly in poor countries. The projection predicted mass starvation and death from disease when resources ran out. Given the inability of Africa to reduce poverty and boost food production, new 21st century projections should renew concern over population bomb devastation to come.

Africa’s population today is an already unsustainable 1.2 billion people. By 2035, the continent will contain 1.9 billion people, a population rise of one-third in 18 years. No projection in agricultural or economic growth comes near in coping with that figure. Two decades from now, Africans will make up one half of the world’s people. Of course, Africa’s population will be the world’s youngest, with a third of Africans still to be born between now and then.

A condom dispenser in a public toilet in South Africa bearing the red ribbon symbol of the global AIDS awareness movement testifies to the strong link made between condom use and HIV infection prevention, rather than as a method of birth control.

Photo courtesy Jorge Lásca/Flickr
While marketers salivate at the large number of new consumers filling the retail shopping malls of tomorrow, the reality is that social chaos (not to mention terrorist bombs) can easily upset those visions.

**Apathy toward population crises ensures a worsening problem**

The reason for the dropping of the population crisis from African discourse is entirely one of apathy. Dismissing the issue from Africa’s planning agenda outweighs any complaint that the effort could be complex or futile. In fact, not much work has gone into population control in recent years. Health ministries cannot claim that population efforts are too cumbersome or too resisted by Africans to succeed. The fact is that efforts to curb population growth have been minimal in most African countries.

While condoms are distributed today throughout the continent in unprecedented numbers, this is due to HIV/AIDS. Condom use is now associated with HIV-prevention and not family planning. When clinic personnel instruct the public on condom use, they do not advise on the tool’s original use to prevent unwanted pregnancies. Rarely seen are public health awareness campaigns stressing the need for families to reduce child-rearing to the number of children they can afford. Once visible, these crusades have largely been replaced by HIV/AIDS prevention messages. The African health apparatus, from NGOs to government health ministries, have made the decision not to promote population control in the wake of HIV/AIDS because new births are needed to offset AIDS mortalities.

As the AIDS crisis is further diminished by a combination of prevention efforts and new drugs, the need to return public health awareness to the danger of large populations is apparent. A possible vaccine to prevent HIV is being tested in South Africa. Once this vaccine is perfected, the continent’s primary health emergency will end, but population growth will take off at even more unsustainable levels than today.

As the AIDS crisis is further diminished by a combination of prevention efforts and new drugs, the need to return public health awareness to the danger of large populations is apparent.
Population control can be achieved in Africa

Faced with physical limitations of geography, be it the size of an island nation or the domination of desert in the land, some African nations have sought population control as a means to preserve natural resources and also to achieve economic growth. In those nations where population control policies have been instituted by governments serious about social welfare, such as in Cape Verde, Mauritius and Mali, population growth has been successfully diminished. Ethiopia and Rwanda have also seen population drops after sustained population control efforts. Not coincidentally, Ethiopia now has East Africa’s best performing economy, and Rwanda can lay the same claim for Central Africa.

Climate change will make the need for population control even more urgent. Just as Southern Africa’s agricultural lands could not produce under a record drought in 2016, and the same occurred in East Africa in 2017, extreme weather and drought will reduce food production and create more storm and flooding emergencies. Large populations will clash over diminishing resources, be it on the Nile River, or Lake Chad water or the Gulf of Guinea fisheries. Conflict will be the inevitable result of unaddressed population pressures.

ACM ANALYSIS IN BRIEF | Africa’s population boom presents renewed opportunities for conflict

Terror groups and political instability will thrive as the limited resources of African nations are further strained by rising populations. Population growth is a forgotten crisis to governments, as well as health and social services organisations who need to wake up to the danger.

Key points:
- Africa’s population growth exceeds economic growth, ensuring more poor and lesser quality social services
- Half the world’s people will be African by 2035, as the continent sees a population rise by one-third from 1.2 billion to 1.9 billion people
- The few African countries that have pursued population growth policies have been rewarded with the continent’s best performing economies and firmest political stability

RELEVANT READING ...

- ‘Sustainability and redefining African development: Meeting targets or creating change?’
  In On Africa assesses Africa’s efforts and progress toward ‘sustainable development’ and argues that real, transformative change is needed to unlock the potential within Africa’s diverse communities, businesses, economies and cultures - http://bit.ly/2qmBH5k

- “Africa’s demographic transition: Dividend or disaster?”
  In this 2015 report, the World Bank provides recommendations to establish a positive impact of population growth on African countries’ economies and the well-being of families - http://bit.ly/2qZkCgv
This is a goal to achieve together.
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World leaders have set an ambitious Global Goal of zero hunger by 2030. With it, kids like Anne-Sophie will have a better chance of unlocking their full potential.

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Putting local peace building on the map
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Kasereka’s transformation was possible because of the knowledge and support of a local peacebuilding organisation, Centre Resolution Conflicts.

50% of wars restart within ten years of a peace treaty being signed.

For peace to last, the voices and concerns of communities affected by conflict must be heard.

Yet international agencies and decision makers are often unaware of the extent and impact of local peacebuilders in conflict zones.

We’re putting local organisations building peace on the map.

Peace Direct supports and promotes Centre Resolution Conflicts and many other local organisations around the world.

Read about them at www.peacedirect.org. View interactive mapping of 1400 local organisations working to resolve conflict at www.insightonconflict.org.

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COMING UP

COMING UP IN

June 2017 Edition

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COMING UP IN

Highlights readers can anticipate in ACM July 2017:
• Africa gets caught up in a Middle East controversy as countries choose sides between support for Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
• Lesotho’s third general election in five years results in another coalition government but little confidence that political stability is imminent.
• Africa’s Atlantic coast nations create a super-agency to confront high seas crimes from piracy to smuggling.
• The latest human rights report on Burundi finds a country living in fear of the Nkurunziza regime.
• Moroccans demonstrating for human rights and democracy are met with a hardline response from the government of absolute monarch King Mohammed VI.

Expert insights for informed decision-making | The ACM methodology

As an In On Africa (IOA) publication, ACM draws on the vast expertise and experience of IOA’s team of more than 300 expert consultants. IOA has on-the-ground representation and working capacity in 31 African countries, as well as networks that extend across all 54 African states. IOA team members are fluent in 33 indigenous African languages. They are also present in 28 countries outside of Africa, informing a holistic understanding of the impacts, perceptions, challenges and interests of those who are outside Africa, looking in.

The analysis presented to ACM readers each month is guided by extensive research, interviews and discussions between some of the leading experts on peace and security in Africa. This analysis is also guided by the needs and interests of our readers, so please don’t hesitate to contact us.

Please send us your thoughts, feedback and suggestions so we can continue to better align ACM with your needs and interests: claire@inonafrica.com.
AFRICA COUNTRY BENCHMARK REPORT 2017

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