Limited operational structure and shaky inter-participant relations bode ill for the MNJTF
By Conway Waddington
In Brief: The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNTJF) appears to be in trouble. The force appears woefully undersized and hamstrung by operational dictates and it now seems that the alliance of participants is beginning to fall apart. Boko Haram, meanwhile, is exerting significant pressure on the MNJTF’s participants, with relentless attacks against civilians and military across the region.
The MNJTF, comprising troops from the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) membership, increasingly appears unlikely to be able to bring much change to the Boko Haram insurgency that has swept through north-eastern Nigeria and to its neighbours to the east. The finalised force size, structure and scope of operations gives little reason to expect the force to be able to, by itself, significantly degrade or contain the Islamist militant insurgency.
In October and November 2015, Boko Haram ramped up its attacks on not only Nigeria, but also Cameroon, Chad and Niger. These attacks have led to declarations of states of emergency by Chad and Niger, and have resulted in those countries refocusing their security efforts on their own territories. Tensions within the MNJTF, which have simmered over operational and organisation restrictions imposed by Nigeria, have further increased, with Chad in particular appearing a more and more reluctant participant.
This article is extracted from the December 2015 edition of IOA’s Africa Conflict Monitor (ACM). The essential +80 page monthly report that dissects conflict developments and trends across the African continent to guide businesses, governments, academics and other stakeholders in Africa’s growth and stability.
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Task force’s slow development may have lacked necessary capability from the outset
Over the past several months, periodic news releases of further steps toward the deployment of the MNJTF raised questions regarding the potential impact that this force could have. After gaining early and substantial regional and international support, the proposed joint force of Lake Chad neighbours (Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, along with additional ally Benin), stalled in June and July. The reason for this revolved around delays in finalising a force and command structure proposal – with Nigeria’s demand that the MNJTF should fall under overall Nigerian command proving to be an especially troublesome stumbling block.
Photo a screenshot of Boko Haram video courtesy Aaron Y. Zelin/jihadology.net
By the beginning of August, overall command of the force was guaranteed to remain Nigerian. Progress resumed, with the MNJTF being formally headquartered in N’Djamena, Chad – as well as at operating bases in northern Cameroon and at the original headquarters of a previous (and much smaller and effectively non-functioning) version of the MNJTF in Baga in north-eastern Nigeria. The Baga base was infamously overrun by Boko Haram in early 2015, which played a role in enervating the reformation of this current MNJTF iteration.
Importantly, the force composition of around 8,700 troops and a command structure had been finalised, with Nigeria and Chad each contributing over 3,000 troops and the remainder made up by the other partners. This force composition is worth considering in light of the vast area in which the conflict is taking place. Clearly, the MNJTF cannot hope to achieve any meaningful successes if its role is to be a garrison force as it would be stretched far too thinly.
Also finalised during the long lead-up to deployment was the area of operations for the force, which effectively limited activities along the shared border regions in the Lake Chad area. This limitation raises several important considerations. First, these are the areas of a ‘joint’ security threat, and are strategically important in terms of limiting Boko Haram’s infiltration and exfiltration capabilities to recruit or resupply outside of Nigeria. Second, this smaller area of operations means that the relatively small force is not completely dwarfed by geography. At the same time, however, Boko Haram’s primary stronghold still appears to be within Nigeria, in the Sambisa Forest (with other force concentrations around Lake Chad and in the mountain ranges along the Nigeria/northern Cameroonian border). Nigeria’s reluctance regarding the operations of the MNJTF is clearly at work here as the idea of a multinational force freely conducting operations within Nigeria is a politically difficult pill to swallow.
The MNJTF’s limited size and constrained geographic scope effectively curtails the ways in which it can operate against Boko Haram. While the force appears designed to interdict Boko Haram forces moving through the border areas around Lake Chad, it is neither mandated to nor capable of doing much else. As a result of these limited capabilities, the MNJTF is not likely to be able to, by itself, achieve a decisive victory over the insurgent group.
This limitation does not prevent the MNJTF from being valuable in other respects. Aside from its (apparent) primary focus on reducing cross-border incursions by Boko Haram, the MNJTF serves as a potential cornerstone for improved regional cooperation. Intelligence-sharing and cooperative/coordinated joint force operations between Nigeria and her neighbours have been near non-existent, especially in the fight against Boko Haram. Logistical and practical challenges to such cooperation are numerous, not least of all language barriers. However, the primary limiting factor for Nigeria has been political, in its ostensive role as the regional powerhouse. Thus, Nigeria has been reluctant to even admit that it needs assistance with the Boko Haram insurgency, let alone ask for (regional) intervention. It is worth noting that in early and mid-2015, when Nigerien and Chadian forces did engage in military operations inside Nigerian territory against Boko Haram, those actions had been bilaterally agreed upon, and not under the auspices of the MNJTF.
Boko Haram has not given up the initiative in the conflict
In mid-November, reports emerged in Nigerian media of a major fire-fight between Boko Haram and a unit of Nigerian troops linked to the MNJTF. Unclear and conflicting reports from sources quoted by newspapers suggested that over 100 Nigerian troops were missing, including the force commander, and that a Nigerian base may have been overrun, with large quantities of arms and ammunition as well as some vehicles reported captured by the insurgents.
Questionable quality of reporting has been a hallmark of the media coverage of the conflict in northern Nigeria, and it was unsurprising when spokesmen for the Nigerian military issued a blanket denial of those accounts. However, the Nigerian military’s own efforts to obscure events and casualties have also been equally prominent throughout the conflict. Regardless of the specific details of these engagements, these events would suggest that Boko Haram has once again turned to its tried and tested tactic of charging headlong into a new threat – just as it did when Cameroon, Chad and Niger first intervened and soon found themselves under attack.
Changes to the tempo and nature of Boko Haram’s insurgency have also resulted in strain for the joint force. From August onwards, Boko Haram has launched numerous attacks on Nigeria’s eastern neighbours, which in October led Niger to declare a state of emergency in Diffa region; and on 9 November, Chad did the same for the Lake Chad region. Chadian forces have since reportedly withdrawn entirely from Cameroon (where they were assisting in combating Boko Haram), and have also pulled back from border areas, focusing on internal security. Nigerian officials have complained that Chad is now responsible for delays affecting MNJTF operations, for which Chad had been a major troop-contributor.
This article is extracted from the December 2015 edition of IOA’s Africa Conflict Monitor (ACM). The essential +80 page monthly report that dissects conflict developments and trends across the African continent to guide businesses, governments, academics and other stakeholders in Africa’s growth and stability.
Current ACM subscribers include AFGRI, AngloAmerican, BP, CNN International, eNCA, Halliburton, IBM, KPMG, MSF, various international government departments and major universities around the globe, ranging from UCT here in South Africa to MIT in Boston, USA.
In early 2015, when the MNJTF’s re-launch was proposed, Boko Haram was driving Nigerian forces out of territories in the north-east of Nigeria. The successes recorded by Boko Haram in this period appeared more akin to a conventional warfare approach to territory-control, which had not been seen before in the conflict. It could be argued that Boko Haram’s actual ability to seize, hold and administer territory was overstated, and that the gains seen were more a matter of the Nigerian government’s failure to mount any meaningful defence; or indeed, as Nigeria’s failure to exert any influence at all in those areas in question. Regardless, by June and July, those apparent territorial gains were largely reversed through cross-border operations against Boko Haram by Niger and Chad, and renewed efforts by the Nigerian military.
Timing of the MNJTF’s deployment could be critical to its success or failure
By August, that phase of the conflict had ended; and the insurgency once again shifted to terror attacks, relying heavily on suicide bombers. Notably, these attacks were increasingly aimed at Nigeria’s neighbours – Cameroon, Chad and Niger – with some commentators contending that the epicentre of the fight had shifted to northern Cameroon or to the Lake Chad region (outside of Nigeria). Major attacks against Yola and Kano cities in Nigeria on 17 and 18 November are, however, indicative that the conflict is still very much alive in north-eastern Nigeria.
Had the MNJTF deployed before August, its actions would have been measured in terms of containing Boko Haram’s expansion – but regardless, its ability to succeed in such a role would have been questionable. At the end of 2015, the MNJTF appears increasingly shaky in terms of the commitment of its constituent members. However, considering the regional spate of terror attacks, the force is set up in such a way as to interdict cross-border insurgent movements, and could yet play a vitally important securitisation role.
Notes:
(1) Conway Waddington is a Regional Analyst with ACM, has contributed papers, reviews and conference material to the Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria, South Africa) and has acted as a peer-reviewer for Scientia Militaria.